CHAPTER V

THE NEW AMERICA

“The reason we are failing behind is the lack of national purpose in our life.”
- Arthur Schlesinger Jr.¹

In the months preceding Eisenhower’s inauguration, Stevenson’s advisors met to discuss the future. Agreeing with Schlesinger, they rightly feared the beginning of an anti-intellectual period, and assumed that Stevenson would be the candidate in 1956 who would bring the ugly new age to an end.² Like monks watching the beginning of the Dark Ages, the liberals worried about how to keep ideas alive in the Eisenhower era so that when the Republicans left office, the Democratic party would be able to govern effectively. And, as Galbraith put it, “How can we do the most to keep the Democratic Party intellectually alert and positive during these years in the wilderness?”³ In addition, the liberals had no desire to spend the campaign season four years hence re-fighting the same old arguments with Stevenson. There seemed to be a need to form a Democratic Study Group, which would educate Stevenson and present solutions for the future.

The Finletter Group was born. John Kenneth Galbraith acted as “Dean of Faculty” and recruited Averell Harriman, Arthur Schlesinger, George Ball, Roy Blough,⁴ Seymour Harris, Clayton Fritchey,⁵ and of course Thomas Finletter. Schlesinger described Thomas Finletter, President Truman’s former Secretary of Air Force: “on domestic issues (he) was a true radical, All-out. He was never perturbed by things that perturbed Stevenson—civil rights, economic policy, and forth. He was older than all of us. He was identified with air power and hare- nosed things like that. That gave weight to his views that Ken Galbraith and I not have with Stevenson.”⁶

The first Finletter Group meeting took place on October 31, 1953, at Finletter’s apartment on 66th Street in New York.⁷

Not wishing to give the impression of setting up a campaign staff, Steven avoided close identification with the group. He did attend two meetings, at which the members found him receptive and educable. Among those presenting ideas at the meetings were the brightest liberal minds in America, such as Paul Samuelson, Dean Acheson, and many others. In 1954 they produced scores of thorough reports, including Schlesinger’s “Foreign Policy Alternatives.” Unfortunately Stevenson, no great reader to begin with, did not take time to study most of them.

But by osmosis, some of the ideas began to sink in. Galbraith summarized:

¹ Henry Fairlie, The Kennedy Promise (Garden City, 1973), 23.
² Martin, Stevenson and the World, 8
³ ibid, 83.
⁴ A member of President Truman’s Council of Economic Advisors.
⁵ Stevenson’s once and future campaign press secretary.
⁶ ibid, 83.
⁷ ibid, 83-85.
The Finletter Group in the 1950s had the very important effect of making things which Stevenson felt were radical in 52 commonplace by 1956.... macroeconomic management of the economy, deficit financing if that were called for by the circumstances, the trade unions, and the need for their support, and the whole range of social security and medical insurance—all things (about) which Stevenson had exhibited a certain measure of nervousness in 1952 were made sensible and commonplace for him in the Finletter discussions.  

Schlesinger too felt Stevenson would respond to reason:

I think we had a lot of impact on him. I can remember when he first asked me to come out and work for him in the 52 campaign, his counsel in Chicago was one of the ablest people I ever met, Carl McGowan. After spending a couple days with Stevenson I went around to McGowan and said “This is wrong for me; he’s far too conservative. I won’t be of any use to him; I better go home.” And McGowan said, “Don’t be a fool, that’s Adlai’s way. He always complains and always resists, but you’ll find out he’s very intelligent, and will respond in the end to rational argument, so don’t give up so quickly.” It was the experience of the Elks Group and the Finletter group that he was intelligent if you could get him to concentrate on something, he would accept the conclusions that his reason dictated, even though sometimes he felt uncomfortable.

Crediting Schlesinger’s contributions, Stevenson revealed, “Arthur has always been extremely helpful— in writing, in ideas, in developing a program. I’ve come closer having a ghost writer in him than in anyone else.” Later, when others had taken over Stevenson’s role as liberal leader, many of the ideas that Elks had resented in the 1950’s found their way to the top of the Kennedy and Johnson agendas.

Perhaps the most important idea that came out of the Finletter Group was Schlesinger’s distinction about the Quality versus the Quantity of Life. As Schlesinger saw the issue in 1955-56, Eisenhower’s institutionalization of the New Deal marked the successful solution to most of the quantative political questions of production, unemployment, the satisfaction of basic material needs. The concerns of 1932 were no longer relevant in 1956. Prospering materially, the suburban swing voters who had elected Eisenhower found themselves suffering from a spiritual malaise. The next problem was how to help America cope with abundance. The quality of American civilization—education, medical care, civil rights, civil liberties, and the arts—was the new issue. And while the crusade abroad was still important, reform at home was the first priority, for only a progressive nation could have a progressive foreign policy. (In particular, slow progress on civil rights weakened America internationally.) The key problem of America was the distribution of goods. Too much of the national wealth went into the private sector, buying cars with big tailfins, and too little went into the public sector, to “buy schools and submarines.”

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8 Interview, 12/8/81.
9 Interview, 1/14/82.
10 Lasky, J.F.K., 304.
Public presentation of the idea in Max Ascoli’s *The Reporter* caused a storm among liberals. Max Ascoli and Adolf Berle called Schlesinger an isolationist. Ascoli also objected to Schlesinger’s use of big government as a solution to every national problem. But Schlesinger had his defenders too, including Harry Truman, Seymour Harris agreed that the complexities of the 20th century demanded a big government. Schlesinger sent a memo outlining his ideas to Senator John F. Kennedy, who pessimistically replied that the conservative Democratic leadership would not permit any sweeping plan of reform.

The Finletter Group as a whole was intrigued by Schlesinger’s approach. Schlesinger wrote a memo to Stevenson for the group entitled “The Central Issue for 1956.” The memo set out the political reasoning behind Schlesinger’s plan, and summarized, “We have a new age, a new prosperity, increasing leisure. Before us there is a vision of a new America. What is the substance of that vision, and what are we doing, what can we do on a large scale, and practically, to realize it? We must act before it is too late, and before the Eisenhower administration sells our national birthright down the river.” “The New America” became the theme of Adlai Stevenson’s 1956 campaign.

John Kenneth Galbraith liked Schlesinger’s idea too. He thought more about the Quality-Quantity distinction, and made it a central theme of *The Affluent Society*. Galbraith had picked up another idea before from Schlesinger. When Schlesinger remarked during the 1954 stock market slump that no one had written even a minimally competent economic history of the 1929 crash, Galbraith decided to write *The Great Crash*. In the 1960’s, New Left critics complained that the emphasis on the Quality of Life had led to neglect of the remaining poor. Questioned about the charge, John Kenneth Galbraith, whose 1958 book *The Affluent Society* had included a chapter on the problem of residual poverty, responded:

This would be to say that anything that concentrating on any issue other than equality and full employment was unwise because it distracted attention from those issues. There’s no reason why you can’t emphasize the quality of life, continued economic growth, greater equality, the struggle against poverty, all at the same time.

Schlesinger himself now feels that the belief that the “basic economic problems which had given rise to the New Deal were more or less solved in the 1950’s (was) to some degree mistaken.”

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14 Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 99. As Kennedy correctly perceived, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, among others, was unwilling to lead the party in a crusade.
15 ibid, 197-198.
16 Galbraith, *A Life in Our Times*, 308.
17 Interview 12/8/81.
18 Interview, 1/14/82.
By 1956, liberalism was recovering. McCarthyism had passed and the Democrats controlled Congress. Moreover, as Schlesinger pointed out in *A Thousand Days*, liberalism was regaining its sense of direction. In 1948, Truman had told the voters “you never had it so good.” Eight years later, the standard of living was even higher, but the Democrats were telling voters that prosperity was not enough.”19 The liberal intellectuals were ready to get America moving again.

Whether the country was ready to get moving again was another matter, Schlesinger thought America was, and told Stevenson that an aggressive Democrat, but not a Hamlet, could beat Eisenhower. Stevenson had been assuming an air of disinterest, rejecting the volunteered services of pollster Elmo Roper, and refusing to contribute to the Schlesinger-edited ADA manual *Guide to Politics 1954*. 20 Although during the 1956 primary season Schlesinger was busy completing *The Crisis of the Old Order*, and had little time to do more for Stevenson than submit an occasional speech, he did offer some advice.21

In October 1955, Schlesinger sent Stevenson a long memo arguing that Truman and the Northern bosses would support Harriman because they disliked Stevenson. Schlesinger advised Stevenson to do what Franklin Roosevelt had done in 1932, and build a constituency by writing letters to leaders around the nation.22 In late 1955, Schlesinger told Stevenson to avoid foreign policy, which was too complicated or campaign discussion, and was Eisenhower’s area of expertise. Stevenson’s interest in exposing the “lies” of the Eisenhower administration seemed to Schlesinger mainly a matter for the historical record that would not “cut much ice vote-wise.”23

As the primaries drew near, Schlesinger warned Stevenson not to underestimate Kefauver, especially in California. He urged Stevenson to make a high-minded, non-political speech to the important California Democratic Council.24 He apparently took the advice too literally, and delivered what he thought was the best political speech of his career, but was, in Martin’s opinion, high-flown and insipid.25 Schlesinger alerted Stevenson that some friends were planning to enter him in the District of Columbia primary, which he would probably lose to Kefauver.26 Schlesinger’s friend Seymour Harris lunched one day with Kefauver’s campaign manager, who unthinkingly outlined some of Kefauver’s Southern strategy. Harris sent the information to Schlesinger, with a note that he did “not know enough about political morality to know whether this information should be passed on.” Schlesinger sent the information to Stevenson with a note, “I have none of Seymour’s scruples.”27

21 ibid, 215, 234.
22 ibid, 202.
23 ibid, 224.
24 ibid, 251.
25 ibid, 255.
26 ibid, 239.
27 ibid, 251.
Although, as Schlesinger expected, the primaries forced Stevenson leftward, civil rights continued to be exasperating. Stevenson’s remarks about “gradualism” frightened liberals, and the refusal to speak out strongly on Emmet Till, the Chicago Negro who had been lynched for allegedly whistling at a white woman, discouraged Schlesinger. Stevenson showed no interest in Schlesinger’s plan to withhold federal funds from states disobeying federal civil rights laws. Instead, he hoped for a one-year moratorium on demonstrations and lawsuits, to give white southern moderates time to move forward. But the main problem Schlesinger saw was not Stevenson’s actions, but his heart. Schlesinger wished that Stevenson would follow Senator John F. Kennedy’s strategy: “If we can communicate (deep) concern, then we can remain as responsible and uncommitted as we want to be when it comes to policy.”

Stevenson was more interested in progressive ideas in the foreign policy field. Schlesinger had advised Stevenson not to bring up the issue of a Hydrogen Bomb test moratorium, for raising the issue would be morally right, it would be politically dangerous. Although atomic testing was an important issue, Schlesinger did not feel Stevenson should risk sacrificing the Presidency for it. “Let Hubert try it. He’s expendable,” Schlesinger offered.

But in April 1956 Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union called for ban on H-Bomb tests. Schlesinger urged Stevenson to call the bluff. On April 21st, 1956, Adlai Stevenson, in a speech partly written by Schlesinger, spoke before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in favor of a ban on H-Bomb testing. The Eisenhower administration, which had been considering such a ban itself, immediately labeled the proposal muddle-headed and impractical. University of California regent John McCone angrily criticized professors who supported Stevenson’s plan.

On July sixth, Schlesinger joined the Stevenson staff full time with the title “Head Speech writer.” Collaborating with Schlesinger were John Bartlow Martin and Willard Wirtz, and a host of part-timers, including John Kenneth Galbraith and Seymour Harris.

Discussing Vice-Presidential possibilities, Schlesinger stated that Humphrey was the most-qualified contender, but Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy would help the ticket more. Schlesinger optimistically wrote the eager Kennedy, “Things look good.” At the convention, Kennedy narrated a film called Pursuit of Happiness, to which

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28 ibid, 285.
29 ibid, 238, 259.
30 ibid, 269.
31 ibid, 301-302.
32 ibid, 259.
33 ibid, 235.
35 Martin, Stevenson and World, 262.
36 ibid, 308-312.
38 Martin, Stevenson and the World, 343.
Schlesinger had contributed. Although Kennedy had campaigned hard for Stevenson in Massachusetts, Stevenson began to retreat from his hints that the Vice-Presidency was Kennedy’s. Hoping to sway the delegates, Kennedy rejected the speech nominating Adlai Stevenson that Schlesinger and Martin had written for Kennedy, and substituted one by Ted Sorenson, Kennedy’s closest advisor. Kennedy did leave in some Schlesinger lines, including the biggest applause-getter of the speech, a reference to Richard Nixon: “Our candidates will be against two of the most skilled campaigners in history- one who takes the high road and one who takes the low road.” Back in the hotel room watching the balloting, Schlesinger remembered that he was for Kennedy at first, but when Albert Gore switched the Tennessee delegation into the Kefauver column, Schlesinger felt an “unexpected onrush of emotion” for Kefauver.

Schlesinger urged Stevenson to run a hard hitting campaign, focusing on economic issues and Richard Nixon. Among those who disagreed with Schlesinger was Robert Kennedy, who had begun following the Stevenson campaign as an observer. Kennedy and Schlesinger kept their distance for most of the campaign. They had had an acrimonious exchange of letters in the New York Times in 1954 of Yalta, the subject of Kennedy’s University of Virginia Law School thesis. Schlesinger remembered, “From my viewpoint on Stevenson’s staff, Robert Kennedy seemed an alien presence, sullen and rather ominous, saying little, looking grim and exuding an atmosphere of bleak disapproval.” While Schlesinger and Galbraith argued Stevenson should campaign against big business, Kennedy disagreed. He also found attacking Nixon pointless, since the people who would respond to anti-Nixon rhetoric were already committed to Stevenson anyway. Kennedy was also frustrated by the campaign’s lack of decisive organization; his journal reported one meeting where

(Stevenson) spent all day long discussing matters that should have taken, at the most, a half hour. For instance, for four hours, with 8 or 12 people there, we discussed who should go on his television program—Senator Anderson, Senator Jackson, or Senator Symington. For another couple of hours we discussed whether the hydrogen bomb was fission or fusion and whether it was safe to say that hydrogen bomb tests should be stopped at one mega-ton… These matters were discussed rather pleadingly, and again no decisions were made. Stevenson was just not a man of action at all.

Although Stevenson never became more decisive, other matters did improve; on a campaign bus to Pittsburgh, Schlesinger and Kennedy found themselves with no alternative but to sit next to each other. To their mutual surprise, they talked cordially and became friends.
But the campaign did not progress as well as their friendship. Even Schlesinger, well-known to prefer the details of political work to issues research thought the campaign “an ordeal, no fun at all.” Perhaps part of the problem was that he found himself, “upstairs writing speeches, while political decisions when being made elsewhere.”

And the political decisions, at least through the eyes of Robert Kennedy and the independent voters, were being made poorly. With the campaign drawing to a close, and Stevenson trailing, in part thanks to the October Suez crisis, he considered raising the issue of Eisenhower’s health. When asked, Schlesinger assured the candidate, “It’s true and the people should know it.” Just before the election, Stevenson spoke on television, and warned the voters that the best scientific evidence indicated that Richard Nixon would be President within four years. Coming at the end of the campaign, the remark looked like a last desperate low blow, and cost Stevenson support. Later, Schlesinger regretfully stated, “I wish I had said it was wrong- because I thought it was.”

Much to the distress of Schlesinger and the rest of the Democratic left, Eisenhower’s re-election primed America for four more years of blandness and mediocrity. What Partisan Review, and other intellectual opinion-makers had begun under Truman—a positive re-evaluation of American life—had degenerated into a shallow acceptance of all things American. Schlesinger’s own brand of history, which emphasized class conflict, fell into disfavor as “consensus history,” which argued that the American past contained few sharp, unresolvable conflicts, became popular.

Even intellectuals, it seemed, were being swallowed up in a vast consensus of happy feelings about America. Time, the official house organ of the middlebrow, which had complained in 1953 about the gap between the intellectual and society, could by 1956 devote a story to the new breed of intellectuals such as Jacques Barzun and Herman Wouk who showed the intellectual as a Man of Affirmation, instead of Man of Protest. Schlesinger replied that there were many possible roles for the intellectual, and that affirming Henry Luce’s vision of America was not the only one. To combat the stifling unanimity, thought Schlesinger, America needed more critical intellectuals. He even had kind words for the right-wing columnist Westbrook Pegler, for Pegler’s willingness to criticize the established order.

But everywhere Schlesinger looked, he saw only more and more conformity. Things got so bad that Schlesinger found the need to remind Saturday Evening Post readers that “Our New-Found Leisure Won’t Bore Us, If Some of It is Spent in Reading.”

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47 Martin, Stevenson and the World, 298, 354.
48 Current Biography 1979, 330.
49 Martin, Stevenson and the World, 390.
50 Some historiographers, on the basis of The Vital Center, place Schlesinger in the consensus schools. But ascribing a consensus view to his history is to miss his thesis, for he believed that the ages of Jackson and Roosevelt showed an irrepressible class conflict. That Schlesinger thought the class conflict could be resolved within the framework of liberal democracy did not make the conflict any less serious. But after working with President Kennedy later, Schlesinger would conclude that the sharpest period of American class struggle lay in the past, not the future.
He feared America was becoming a nation of “viewers, rather thinkers.” Part of the problem of the nation of viewers was the debasing effect of the “competitive situation” on television programming. Agreeing with John Quincy Adams that a government is responsible for the “moral, political, and intellectual improvement” of its citizens, Schlesinger urged the F.C.C. to set minimum quality guidelines.

Schlesinger saw the problem as an American retreat from individualism into a collectivist, corporate ethos. When social commentators observed growing trends toward androgyny, Schlesinger explained, “If people do not know who they are, it is hardly surprising that they are no longer sure what sex they are.” The whole problem could be traced to national leadership. In a 1958 *Saturday Evening Post* article, he bemoaned, “The Decline of Greatness.” The present age, unlike the one just passed, had few giants or towering figures. The nation needed to once more find the great man, who, like lightening, would ignite the creative energy of the nation. “If our society has lost its wish for heroes and its ability to produce them, it may well turn out to have lost everything else as well.”

But others worried that over-reliance on “great leaders” would be destructive of democracy. Some critics argue that Schlesinger and the rest of the liberals relied on charismatic leaders to carry out programs that the intellectuals could not rationally convince the populace to follow. In 1960, when the tides of world politics seemed to be flowing back towards heroic leadership, Schlesinger addressed some of the concerns about great men. He happily noted the trend in the Third World and in Western Europe towards powerful personal leadership. But did not the trend threaten democratic institutions? Schlesinger admitted that John Locke saw no special role for the leader. But democracy, Schlesinger argued, is not self-executing. Our system of checks and balances tended towards inertia. While one might resist heroic leadership on ideological grounds, heroic leadership *in practice* made democracy function better. On a more fundamental level, heroic leadership was necessary to remind the populace that an individual could make a difference—that individual choice mattered.

In any case, thought Schlesinger, tyranny was unlikely. Strong traditions of liberty in the United States and Britain kept rulers from going too far. Realistically assessing the role of leaders would prevent over-reliance on them: One should see what the leader said and felt about democracy, and whether he persuaded or manipulated the populace; “The emergence of a cult of personality, for example, is an obvious danger sign.” But the real danger came not from strong popular leadership, but from the vacuum caused by inertia. As long as popular leaders made government function effectively, no cry for a Caesar

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56 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *The Modern Caesars versus Democracy*, address May 19, 1960 at the University of New Brunswick.
would arise. As asked whether reliance on heroic leaders and elites conflicted with majority rule, Schlesinger replied:

I regard democracy as essentially an educational process, a process of persuasion. Someone has to take the lead in persuading the majority; that’s the role of leadership. It seems to me that majorities don’t form spontaneously. It’s a process of reflection and taking positions on issues. And as the majority forms it will avail itself to the possible wisdom and information of leaders. I can’t see how democracy can work except through leadership and elites. I see with what Jefferson (said), in his famous letter to John Adams... We should have an aristocracy, but it should be an aristocracy of virtue and talent, and not an aristocracy of birth and wealth.

To Schlesinger, the movement toward heroic leaderships internationally portended a chance for America to rediscover its own national purpose. He wrote a memo for the Finletter Group entitled “The Shape of National Politics to Come,” which expanded on his father’s earlier work *Tides of American Politics*, and argued that the 1960 election would signal the end of the conservative period that had begun in 1947. The coming period of reform would resemble the Progressive Age more than the New Deal, as the discontents of America were currently spiritual rather than economic. Thomas Finletter sent Senator John Kennedy a copy of Schlesinger’s memo, which reinforced Kennedy’s long-standing determination to seek the Presidency in 1960. Along with the Schlesinger memo, “The Big Decision: Private Indulgence or National Power,” Schlesinger’s predictions about the shape of national politics became the “bible” of John F. Kennedy’s campaign. The years Schlesinger, Stevenson, and the rest of the liberals had spent in opposition would bear fruit in 1960, when America was finally ready to listen to a leader who promised to “get the country moving again.”


58 Interview 3/29/82.
60 Lasky, *J.F.K.*, 304-305.